AARO DHS Kona Blue UAP Records Research File

Page 1 February 5, 2024 The Honorable Kathleen H. Hicks Deputy Secretary of Defense 1010 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1010 Dear Dr. Hicks: Thank you for your letter on September 28, 2023. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agrees to provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with documents and relevant information associated with KONA BLUE. KONA BLUE was a DHS prospective special access program (PSAP) terminated on February 10, 2012. The following actions were taken: • All DHS documents associated with the KONA BLUE PSAP are declassified and approved for public release. • The strike-out method was utilized to retain visibility of prior classifications and redactions were made based on policy and legal review. • All pertinent DHS records have been searched and no additional information associated with the KONA BLUE PSAP has been discovered. I appreciate your continued cooperation and support for DHS. Should you wish to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Kristie Canegallo Acting Deputy Secretary

Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 Page 11 Page 12 Page 13 Page 14 Page 15 Page 16 Page 17 Page 18 Page 19 Page 20 Page 21 Page 22 Page 23 Page 24 Page 25 Page 26 Page 27 Page 28 Page 29 Page 30 Page 31 Page 32 Page 33 Page 34 Page 35 Page 36 Page 37 Page 38 Page 39 Page 40 Page 41 Page 42 Page 43 Page 44 Page 45 Page 46 Page 47 Page 48 Page 49 Page 50 Page 51 Page 52 o Undue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program. • Allocation of personnel, support, and oversight. o Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk. o Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities or affiliation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny. o Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a properly administered Restricted SAP. o Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Public awareness of an industry's AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry's further participation with the U.S. Government in this program. • Application and engineering. o The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected, engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval. These decision makers must be afforded tl;le necessary time to make strategic decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program to those on a strict Bigoted List. 'cf Associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts within the world of quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory, gravities, and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be use� with catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of operational security and read-on discretion is required. Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, we will require a small, specialized group ofDoD personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program are assigned to further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (see Attachment 1). These individuals all currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support to AATIP.