The strategic role of banks for the mafias emerges from the Easy Money investigation
The strategic role of banks for the mafias emerges from the Easy Money investigation
The recent maxi-investigation called "Easy money" carried out by the District Anti-Mafia Directorate of Florence, among the various criminal conduct, also revealed the existence of a clandestine bank capable of moving over one hundred million euros a year. This data confirms that for a large criminal organization, such as the 'Ndrangheta, a bank (or a financial intermediary) represents a decisive strategic hub: it makes it possible to clean up billions of euros of illicit origin and, at the same time, to exercise a role of "lender of last resort" in the relevant territory. The investigations of the Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate (DIA) and the Bank of Italy highlight the paths used to penetrate the structures of a banking institution reaching the heart of the board of directors.
Generally speaking, large national banks are more difficult to infiltrate, thanks to more stringent controls and more widespread supervisory activity. On the contrary, small cooperative credit banks and rural banks, rooted in a local context, are historically more exposed. The mafia never acts by openly declaring itself: it makes use of "white collars", apparently unsuspecting frontmen, corporate shields and asset management trusts based in tax-advantaged jurisdictions. A recurring method consists in the gradual acquisition of shares and share packages, working "in stages" and remaining below the thresholds that activate automatic controls by the supervisory authorities. By accumulating shareholdings, clan men can insert themselves into boards of directors or boards of auditors, with roles that guarantee access to decisions and operational influence. In many cases, the objective is not to control the entire bank, but to intercept and influence the key figures: in fact, we speak of "infiltration from below".
In concrete terms, the strategy involves identifying vulnerable branch managers or credit office employees, for example due to economic difficulties, gambling-related debts or a marked propensity for greed. Alternatively, threats and blackmail are used. Once the official has been "hooked", two essential tasks are imposed on him: approving loans to companies linked to organized crime, destined not to be repaid and therefore to drain the bank's resources; above all, omitting or not reporting suspicious financial transactions, the so-called SOS, to the Bank of Italy, leaving the money laundering flow operational. The new mafias intensify these maneuvers especially in periods of economic crisis, when legitimate banks reduce the offer of loans to companies in difficulty. If a local entrepreneur is in debt and can no longer meet the deadlines, the clans intervene by offering immediate liquidity, presented as a solution to "save" him. In reality, it is a usurious trap: when the entrepreneur is unable to repay the mafia debt, the company is progressively acquired or emptied. If the company had guarantees, credit lines or significant contractual and participatory power within a local bank, the mafia automatically inherits that position and the associated influence in the credit institution.
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for clans to decide to build their own structures. They obtain licenses to open exchange bureaus, microcredit companies, payment and financial institutions. These entities are often set up abroad, in countries with less stringent anti-money laundering regulations, and operate as true "shadow banks". Through international banking correspondence channels, they are connected to the circuits of large legal banks, with the effect of passing illicit money into the global financial system, disguising it as ordinary commercial flows. When mafias manage to control a credit circuit, they do not necessarily pursue traditional banking profit. The main objective is to use the institute as a "washing machine": even by accepting operational losses, they aim to convert "black" money (coming from drug trafficking or extortion) into "legal" money, justified by financial operations and exchanges formally attributable to legitimate activities. In this context, the supervision of the Bank of Italy and the introduction of rigorous machine learning models by the UIF (Financial Intelligence Unit) are fundamental to intercept corporate and transactional anomalies before the clans permanently consolidate their presence in the decision-making structures.
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